Impact of COVID-19 on Renewable Energy Auctions

This is the final version. Available from AURES II via the link in this recordAuctions for renewable energy (RES) support are market-based, competitive bidding processes to identify the most appropriate RES projects to be constructed within a certain time frame and allocate support payments to these projects. Most EU Member States have introduced RES auctions that seem to have resulted in strong price decreases. The COVID-19 pandemic, its consequential lock-down of economic activity, the increased risks for investors and fears about an economic recession, have had profound immediate effects on the energy sector. Power demand has strongly decreased and there is high uncertainty for the mid-term. Industry associations worry that a reduced power demand and tighter budgets could reduce new auction volumes of RES projects.European Commissio

Auctions for Renewable Energy Support II - First insights and results of the Horizon2020 project AURES II

This is the final version. Available from Funcas via the link in this recordThe Horizon2020 project AURES II aims at ensuring the effective implementation of auctions for renewable energies in the EU Member States (MS). In recent years, auction schemes for the allocation of support for renewable electricity sources (RES) have been advancing rapidly across Europe. Auctions are considered to have brought down support levels and increased planning capability for RES deployment and state budgets. In some unfortunate cases, they have, however, also resulted in delayed or unrealised projects and increased uncertainty for project developers. A variety of auction designs are still being tested and introduced in EU MS, as well as foreseen by European legislation. Therefore, there is still a need for further assessment and improvement of national auction design and implementation to ensure the future success of RES auctions in Europe. Applying different qualitative and quantitative methods in the various work packages (WPs), the AURES II project partners have already drafted and published a large number of reports and studies. This article aims at comprehensively presenting these results and provide a first overview.European Union Horizon 202

Data for: Empirical evidence on discrimination in multi-technology renewable energy auctions in Europe

Data accompanying the submission "Empirical evidence on discrimination in multi-technology renewable energy auctions in Europe" by Julius Buschle, Vasilios Anatolitis, and Patrick Plötz to the journal "Energy Policy". We conducted a fractional logit regression to empirically measure the impact of various auction design elements on the success rates of two technologies, solar PV and onshore wind, in multi-technology renewable energy auctions, based on data from 57 auction rounds from 2011 – 2021 in Europe.Here, you can find the following data:1. R-code for the curation of data and the regression analysis2. Renewable energy shares in European countries (based on data from Eurostat and own interpolation) for control variables3. Data on European auctions (based on AURES II Auction Database) for dependent and explanatory variablesTHIS DATASET IS ARCHIVED AT DANS/EASY, BUT NOT ACCESSIBLE HERE. TO VIEW A LIST OF FILES AND ACCESS THE FILES IN THIS DATASET CLICK ON THE DOI-LINK ABOV

AURES II Auction Database

This database contains the outcomes and designs of all renewable energy auctions conducted in the European Union + the UK in the years 2011-2021.The data was collected as part of the project AURES II (Auctions for Renewable Energy Support II). This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 817619.THIS DATASET IS ARCHIVED AT DANS/EASY, BUT NOT ACCESSIBLE HERE. TO VIEW A LIST OF FILES AND ACCESS THE FILES IN THIS DATASET CLICK ON THE DOI-LINK ABOV

How to design efficient renewable energy auctions? Empirical insights from Europe

Data accompanying the article Anatolitis, V., Azanbayev, A., Fleck, A.-K. (2022): "How to design efficient renewable energy auctions? Empirical insights from Europe". We conducted a fixed effects panel data regression to investigate the effects of certain auction design elements on the awarded prices in renewable energy auctions in Europe. Here you can find the following data:1. R-code for the curation of data and the regression analysis2. Renewable energy shares in European countries (based on data from Eurostat and own interpolation) for control variables3. Data on European auctions (based on AURES II Auction Database) for dependent and explanatory variablesThis research was conducted as part of the project AURES II (Auctions for Renewable Energy Support II). This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 817619.THIS DATASET IS ARCHIVED AT DANS/EASY, BUT NOT ACCESSIBLE HERE. TO VIEW A LIST OF FILES AND ACCESS THE FILES IN THIS DATASET CLICK ON THE DOI-LINK ABOV

The short-term costs of local content requirements in the Indian solar auctions

Developing and emerging economies are implementing local content requirements (LCRs) to spur domestic manufacturing though their costs and benefits are not well understood and difficult to quantify. Here, we provide an empirical assessment of the short-term costs of LCRs using a credible counterfactual. We analyse data on government-run solar PV auctions held in India between 2014-2017 and exploit the fact that not all of the auctioned contracts entailed LCRs. We find that LCR policies resulted in a ~6% per kWh increase in the cost of solar PV power generated from those projects when compared to similar projects not subjected to the same LCR policy. During this three-year time period, Indian solar panels remained around 14% more expensive than international panels. We found some evidence of short-term increases in domestic manufacturing capacity, yet, during this short period Indian firms did not increase market share or break into export markets

Auctions for Renewable Energy Support: Lessons Learned in the AURES Project

This is the final version. Available from International Association for Energy Economics via the DOI in this recordMarket-based, competitive bidding processes, i.e., auctions, are becoming a dominant policy instrument for securing future electricity production from renewable energy sources (RES) around the world. The rapid growth is striking: in 2005, only six countries employed RES auctions, and by 2017 at least 84 countries had adopted the mechanism. This article outlines the rationale for the shift, describes some of the key design characteristics of auctions, together with best practices and potential pitfalls, and briefly considers the future of auctions in the face of declining support needs